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THE SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN OF MUNICIPAL ZONING: THE
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT AS A MEANS TO
CONSISTENT PROTECTION FOR CHURCH-SPONSORED
HOMELESS SHELTERS AND SOUP KITCHENS
Despite the increase in poverty and homelessness in the United States, many
municipalities are attempting to use zoning regulations to limit the spread of
church-sponsored programs that minister to the poor. Although the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) suggests that courts should find church-
sponsored programs exempt from the burdens of municipal zoning, recent decisions
in federal courts demonstrate that church-sponsored homeless shelters and soup
kitchens will receive the same inconsistent protection they received under tradition-
al Free Exercise Clause analysis. This Note argues that enforcement of zoning
regulations places a substantial burden on church-sponsored programs that minis-
ter to the poor, and that municipalities may often fail to provide adequate justifica-
tion for their regulations under RFRA. Consequently, religious plaintiffs should
receive exemptions from municipal zoning regulations. Nevertheless, this Note con-
tends that municipalities retain sufficient control over church-sponsored homeless
shelters and soup kitchens through the use of reasonable safety restrictions and
common law public nuisance actions.
INTRODUCTION
Everyday, between six and seven hundred thousand people go without
shelter in the United States.' Nevertheless, in an era in which Congress
looks to churches as "'the great untapped resource in the welfare reform
debate,"' 2 municipalities often seek to use zoning regulations to prevent
churches from operating shelters and soup kitchens designed to alleviate the
burdens of homelessness.' Faced with municipal opposition, church-spon-
Guy Gugliotta, HUD Awards $900 Million for Homeless; Programs in District,
Maryland and Virginia to Get $49 Million, WASH. POST, July 11, 1995, at Al; Sue
Anne Pressley, Homeless Feeling the Chill; Austin, Other Cities Are Cracking Down,
WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1995, at Al, A14.
2 Laurie Goodstein, Churches May Not Be Able to Patch Welfare Cuts, WASH.
POST, Feb. 22, 1995, at Al (quoting Representative Tim Hutchinson (R-Ark.)).
3 See, e.g., First Assembly of God of Naples, Fla., Inc. v. Collier County, 20 F.3d
419 (11th Cir. 1994) (reviewing county enforcement of zoning regulations to close a
homeless shelter), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 730 (1995); Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v.
City of Daytona Beach, 885 F. Supp. 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (reviewing municipal deni-
al of a permit to operate a church-sponsored homeless shelter and soup kitchen); West-
ern Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C.
1994) (reviewing municipal enforcement of zoning regulations to bar church-sponsored
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sored homeless shelters and soup kitchens have sought to use the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)4 to obtain exemptions from the
burdens of local zoning regulation. Although recent judicial decisions in the
District of Columbia and Florida suggest that religious plaintiffs are likely to
enjoy mixed success in their efforts to obtain such exemptions,5 this Note
will argue that RFRA's elevated conception of religious liberty should pro-
vide greater protection to church-sponsored homeless shelters and soup
kitchens than was previously found under traditional free exercise analysis
and the standards of Employment Division v. Smith.'
Part I will demonstrate that RFRA's enactment represents a renewed
recognition that religious liberty claims deserve strict scrutiny review by the
courts. Part II will contend that church-sponsored homeless shelters and
soup kitchens are traditionally religious activities such that enforcement of
municipal zoning against church homeless programs represents a substantial
burden on the churches' and volunteers' free exercise of religion. Finally,
Part III will identify circumstances in which municipalities may regulate
church-sponsored homeless programs without violating the protections af-
forded by RFRA.
I. RFRA: STATUTORY PROTECTION FOR FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS
Congress enacted RFRA in response to widespread criticism of the Su-
preme Court's 1990 decision in Smith.7 Prior to Smith, claims for religious
soup kitchen); Jesus Ctr. v. Farmington Hills Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 544 N.W.2d
(Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (barring homeless shelter as an "accessory use" to a church).
The problems occasioned by a vast homeless population increasingly have led mu-
nicipalities to undertake a variety of measures designed to discourage the homeless
from remaining a visible problem, including "public-place restrictions, police sweeps,
restrictions against service providers and selective enforcement of vagrancy and other
laws." Guy Gugliotta, Hunger and Homelessness on the Rise, Mayors Warn, WASH.
POST, Dec. 20, 1994, at A8.
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-1 (Supp. V 1993). Under RFRA, "Government
shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability," unless it can demonstrate that application of the
burden "is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental inter-
est." Id. § 2000bb-1.
' Compare Daytona Rescue Mission, 885 F. Supp. at 1554 (upholding denial of mu-
nicipal permit for operation of a church-sponsored homeless shelter and soup kitchen)
with Western Presbyterian Church, 862 F. Supp. at 538 (holding that enforcement of
zoning regulations to bar church-sponsored soup kitchen was an impermissible burden
on the church's religious freedom).
6 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
7 HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT OF 1993,
H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1993), available in WESTLAW, Legislative
History database [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 88] (noting that RFRA is "[tlhe legislative
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exemptions to generally applicable laws were governed by the standard
developed in Sherbert v. Verner.' Under Sherbert, "any incidental burden
on the free exercise of ... religion [had to] be justified by a 'compelling
state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional
power to regulate."' 9 After Sherbert, the Court applied its analysis with
response to the Smith decision"); SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RESTORATION ACT OF 1993, S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1993), reprinted
in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1893 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 111] (stating that RFRA "re-
sponds to the Supreme Court's decision" in Smith).
For criticism of Smith, see John Delaney, Police Power Absolutism and Nullifying
the Free Exercise Clause: A Critique of Oregon v. Smith, 25 IND. L. REV. 71 (1991);
James D. Gordon, III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91 (1991);
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1109 (1990); see also James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1409-10 (1992)
(describing media, academic, political, and religious criticism of Smith).
In 1995, a federal district court in Texas declared RFRA unconstitutional under the
separation of powers doctrine. Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355, 357 (W.D.
Tex. 1995), rev'd, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996). Specifically, the court held that RFRA
violated Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), because it was enacted to
overturn the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in Smith.
Flores, 877 F. Supp. at 357. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that RFRA was a valid
exercise of congressional power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Flores v. City
of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1363 (5th Cir. 1996).
With RFRA, Congress statutorily expanded the scope of free exercise protection
beyond that authorized in Smith. According to the one-way "ratchet" theory, Congress is
authorized to expand the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but it is not permitted to contract protection below the mini-
mum guaranteed by the Constitution. Matt Pawa, Comment, When the Supreme Court
Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can Congress Save Us? An Examination of Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1062 (1993). Although RFRA
expands the interpreted protections of the Free Exercise Clause, the incorporation of the
First Amendment permits congressional expansion of free exercise rights. See Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (permitting congressional expansion of Eighth Amendment
rights because of the amendment's incorporation). Accordingly, RFRA is not an uncon-
stitutional assumption of judicial power. For a detailed analysis of the ratchet theory
and RFRA's constitutionality, see Pawa, supra.
8 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist was fired when she
refused to work on Saturday, her sabbath. Id. at 399. After being denied unemployment
benefits because she had failed to accept offered work without good cause, Sherbert
filed suit against South Carolina, successfully arguing that the state's refusal to grant
benefits unconstitutionally burdened her free exercise rights. Id. at 400-01.
' Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). Prior to
Sherbert, the Court had repeatedly refused to recognize free exercise exemptions. See,
e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (holding that a neutral statute
which regulated solicitation in general did not implicate free exercise protection simply
because the solicitation at issue was religious); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
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varying degrees of devotion and success." As several Representatives not-
ed during passage of RFRA, Sherbert "represent[ed] the zenith of free exer-
cise jurisprudence, where religious plaintiffs who sought to have their indi-
vidual claims balanced against government interests actually prevailed."".
On the other hand, notwithstanding the inconsistent application of the Free
Exercise Clause's protections, Smith was the most explicit repudiation of the
heightened scrutiny traditionally afforded religious claims.
In Smith, the Court held that a generally applicable law could burden an
individual's religiously motivated conduct without subjecting the law to the
heightened scrutiny traditionally required by Sherbert." Accordingly, the
161-62 (1878) (refusing to excuse Mormon defendant from a bigamy conviction even if
he was acting "in conformity with ... a religious duty"). But see Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (refusing to grant a religious exemption but foreshadowing
Sherbert by noting that a generally applicable law with secular goals "is valid despite
its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose
by means which do not impose such a burden").
" See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988) (refusing to limit timber cutting on federal land used for Native American reli-
gious rituals); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (refusing to grant free exercise ex-
emption from state requirement that parents obtain social security number for child in
order to participate in federal social welfare programs); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) (granting Amish parents an exemption from state law requiring children to
attend high school until age 16).
1' H.R. REP. No. 88, supra note 7, at 15 (additional views of Rep. Henry J. Hyde et
al.).
12 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990). In Smith, the respondents
worked at a drug rehabilitation organization until their employer discovered that the re-
spondents had used peyote for sacramental purposes as part of their membership in the
Native American Church. Id. at 874. The respondents were denied state unemployment
benefits "because they had been discharged for work-related 'misconduct"'; namely, the
consumption of illegal drugs. Id. Smith and Black sued Oregon, alleging that their free
exercise rights had been violated when the State refused to grant them a religious ex-
emption that would permit them to receive unemployment benefits. Id.
Although the Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court used the
Sherbert test repeatedly to find that Oregon had violated the respondents' free exercise
rights, see Smith v. Employment Div., 709 P.2d 246 (Or. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd, 721
P.2d 445 (Or. 1986), remanded, 485 U.S. 660 (1988), aff'd, 763 P.2d 146 (Or. 1988),
rev'd, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990), the United States Supreme Court refused to hold
"that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate." Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-
79. Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion, noted that if the Sherbert test
were employed, religious individuals would enjoy "a private right to ignore generally
applicable laws ... a constitutional anomaly." Id. at 886. He explicitly rejected its
application to claims for exemptions from criminal laws. Id. at 883-84.
Although Justice Scalia had the support of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, Stevens, and Kennedy, the balance of the Court took sharp issue with the
majority's rejection of the Sherbert test. Justice O'Connor noted:
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immediate effect of Smith was to virtually guarantee the constitutionality of
any generally applicable law that burdened religion.
Justice Scalia argued that the political process would act to protect
against religious oppression and excessive burdens on free exercise. 3 Al-
though courts were not permitted to excuse churches and individuals from
generally applicable laws that burdened their free exercise, government
could enact "nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption[s]."" Justice
Scalia recognized that "leaving accommodation to the political process
[would] place [minority religions] at a relative disadvantage[,] ... but that
[was an] unavoidable consequence of democratic government."' 5 The alter-
native was "a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in
which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality
of all religious beliefs."' 6
RFRA explicitly reestablished Sherbert's compelling interest test in an
effort to "provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise
[was] substantially burdened by government."' 7 Under RFRA, government
may not substantially burden the free exercise of religion unless it demon-
strates that the burden "(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest."'" Unlike the standard established in Smith, RFRA
[T]he essence of a free exercise claim is relief from a burden imposed by govern-
ment on religious practices or beliefs, whether ... imposed directly through laws
that prohibit or compel specific religious practices, or indirectly through laws that,
in effect, make abandonment of one's own religion or conformity to the religious
beliefs of others the price of an equal place in the civil community.
Id. at 897 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Similarly, Justice Blackmun warned
that the majority was "effectuat[ing] a wholesale overturning of settled law concerning
the Religion Clauses." Id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
When confronted with a burden on the free exercise of religion, O'Connor believed
that "the sounder approach" was to apply the Sherbert test to balance the state's interest
against the free exercise burden. Id. at 899 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
O'Connor argued that use of the test would not invalidate a law in the face of a superi-
or state interest; even under Sherbert's heightened scrutiny, "uniform application of
Oregon's criminal prohibition [was] 'essential to accomplish' its overriding interest in
preventing the physical harm caused by the use of a Schedule I controlled substance."
Id. at 905 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (citation omitted). But see id. at 921
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (concluding that Oregon's justifications for enforcing its drug
laws against the respondents were "not sufficiently compelling to outweigh [plaintiffs']
right to the free exercise of their religion").




17 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. V 1993) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)).
,8 Id. § 2000bb-l(b).
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does not distinguish between laws of general applicability and those which
have impermissible purposes with regard to religion. 9 Under RFRA, courts
may grant exemptions to individuals and churches whose religiously moti-
vated conduct is substantially burdened by laws of general applicability.0
RFRA "was supported by a wall-to-wall coalition of religious and civil
liberties groups"'" who feared that Smith's reliance on the political arena
would tend to embrace only mainstream religion, leaving minority religions
little chance of obtaining exemptions from laws of general application that
burdened their religious exercise. In enacting RFRA, Congress allied it-
self with Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Smith, 23 noting that
[s]tate and local legislative bodies cannot be relied upon to
craft exceptions from laws of general application to protect
the ability of the religious minorities to practice their
faiths ....
"The very purpose of [the] Bill of Rights was to with-
draw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political con-
troversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be ap-
plied by the courts."'24
19 See id. § 2000bb-l(a).
20 See id.
21 Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 895-96 (1994).
2 See McConnell, supra note 7, at 1132 (noting that "political branches, being polit-
ical, will tend to be most solicitous of the value of familiar, popular, and socially ac-
ceptable religious faiths"). But see Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Reli-
gion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611, 1637 (1993) (arguing that minority religions could
obtain majority support for toleration-based exemptions); Mark Tushnet, The Emerging
Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1700 (1988)
(observing that as a result of different interests, religious groups form shifting coali-
tions, preventing the establishment of one religious majority); Ryan, supra note 7, at
1445-51 (arguing that religion already enjoys great success in obtaining legislatively en-
acted religious exemptions, and that minority religions benefit because they often share
political concerns with majority religions).
3 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902-03 (1990) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in judgment).
24 S. REP. No. 111, supra note 7, at 8, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1897
(quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)); see
also H.R. REP. No. 88, supra note 7, at 6 (noting the infeasibility of combatting "the
burdens of generally applicable laws on religion by relying upon the political process
for the enactment of separate religious exemptions in every Federal, State, and local
statute").
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Although Congress enacted RFRA out of fear that the political process
might afford little comfort to those seeking religious exemptions from gen-
erally applicable laws, RFRA is far from a panacea for free exercise ills.
Courts are not insusceptible to majoritarian beliefs and often have little
objective criteria upon which to decide whether conduct is religiously moti-
vated.' When confronted with claims for RFRA exemptions from the bur-
dens inflicted by municipal zoning regulations, uncertainty as to that which
constitutes religion may operate to the detriment of religious plaintiffs. In
turn, church-sponsored soup kitchens and homeless shelters may be thwarted
in their attempts to secure exemptions from the burdens of local zoning if
courts fail to recognize that enforcement of municipal zoning places a sub-
stantial burden on the free exercise of religion.
II. MUNICIPAL ZONING OF CHURCH-SPONSORED HOMELESS SHELTERS AS
A SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN ON THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
Zoning is "the most widespread local land-use control tool" in the Unit-
ed States. 2 Although forms of zoning were present in colonial times,27
z See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exer-
cise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 941 (1989). "[D]ecisionmakers tend to fall
back on ... conventional Western patterns of religion [or the] simple equation[] of re-
ligion with Christianity." Id. Even objective standards as to that which constitutes reli-
gion "risk [a] bias toward[s] Western, monotheistic religions." Id. at 959.
This is not to argue that RFRA is irrelevant or fundamentally ineffective. RFRA
gives the religious plaintiff an opportunity for meaningful judicial review. Without
RFRA, legislative bodies would be the only means for religious individuals and church-
es to obtain exemptions from generally applicable laws. A minority religion that was
unable to muster support for its position in the legislature would receive little assistance
from the courts, regardless of the centrality of the conduct to the minority's religion,
because under Smith, courts are permitted only due process review of regulations that
have no specified exemptions. Consequently, the minority religion's chance of success
would be severely limited. RFRA, however, permits courts to review the claims of
churches that are unable to secure legislative exemptions from laws that burden their
religion. Depending on the court's perception of whether a substantial burden exists, the
court can use the compelling interest test to balance the government's and churches'
interests. In addition, a court's error frequently is reviewable. Accordingly, although
reliance on legislatures provides only one method of determining the need for an ex-
emption, RFRA provides several additional effective opportunities for recognition of a
free exercise exemption.
26 RUTHERFORD H. PLAT, LAND USE CONTROL: GEOGRAPHY, LAW, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 166 (1991).
27 In colonial times, "slaughter houses, gunpowder mills, and the like [were relegat-
ed] to the outskirts of the municipality." ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF
PROPERTY § 9.3, at 543 (2d ed. 1993). Additionally, in an effort to avoid widespread
destruction in the event of a fire, many localities created "fire districts" whereby certain
types of buildings were prohibited from certain areas. Id.
1996] 1265
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
contemporary development of zoning took place during the early twentieth
century when public concern over urban congestion grew.' With increased
urbanization and industrialization came the realization that zoning was the
natural method of balancing the individual's property rights against society's
interdependency.29
Zoning is a legislative extension of public nuisance law. 3' The doctrine
of public nuisance permits a government entity to enjoin "an 'unreasonable'
activity or condition on [an individual's] land that 'substantially' or
'unreasonably' interferes" with the rights of the general public.3 A nui-
sance is not necessarily the result of illegal activity; it "may be merely a
right thing in the wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barn-
yard."32 Although similar to public nuisance law in that it restricts
individuals' use of their land, zoning differs from nuisance law in that it
attempts to avoid recourse to litigation by prospectively regulating land use
and development before the use becomes an enjoinable offense.
The Supreme Court has never addressed the application of municipal
zoning to churches. 33 In the past, however, the Court has referred to zoning
as one of the "necessary and permissible contacts" between church and
state,34 a conclusion that lower courts appear to have followed.35 Under
the standard enunciated in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,36 a zon-
ing ordinance is constitutional unless "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare."37 In those instances, however, where a zoning ordinance has bur-
' PLATT, supra note 26, at 174-75. In conjunction with the issue of government cor-
ruption, urban congestion was the primary urban issue of the Progressive Movement. Id.
at 175.
29 RICHARD B. COUSER, MINISTRY AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 116 (1993).
30 CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 27, § 9.3, at 543; see Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (noting that the scope of police power
permitting the exercise of zoning is analogous to the law of nuisance).
31 CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 27, § 7.2, at 417.
32 Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388; see also Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb
Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706 (Ariz. 1972) (holding that flies and odors from defendant's
feed lot constituted a nuisance to the developing community around defendant's proper-
ty); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871-73 (N.Y. 1970) (holding that
cement dust from defendant's plant was a nuisance to neighboring property owners).
33 COUSER, supra note 29, at 117.
3 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
35 See, e.g., Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820, 826 (10th
Cir. 1988) (noting that "[a] church has no constitutional right to be free from reasonable
zoning regulations").
36 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
31 Id. at 395. In Village of Euclid, a municipality established a comprehensive zon-
ing plan that regulated "the location of trades, industries, apartment houses, two-family
houses, single family houses, ... the lot area to be built upon, [and] the size and height
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dened free exercise rights, many courts faced with Free Exercise Clause
challenges have applied the Sherbert test to determine whether a religious
exemption was appropriate. Other courts, however, avoided Sherbert's com-
pelling interest test by finding that the regulations did not substantially bur-
den the free exercise of religion.3"
Recent decisions in Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning
Adjustment3 9 and Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona
Beach4" suggest that RFRA's substantial burden prong permits courts to
offer similarly inconsistent protection to church-sponsored homeless pro-
grams that challenge local zoning regulations. Rather than repeat the errors
of the past, courts must recognize that enforcement of zoning regulations
can constitute a substantial burden on the free exercise rights of church-
of buildings." Id. at 379-80. Euclid divided the village into three broad classifications:
use, height, and population density. Id. at 380.
Many years before, Ambler Realty Co. had purchased a tract of land in the hopes
of later selling and developing the land for industrial use. Id. at 384. When Euclid re-
zoned the village, Ambler Realty's property no longer was zoned exclusively for indus-
trial use; instead, part of the tract was restricted to single- and two-family houses, and
part was limited to single- and two-family houses and apartment buildings. Id. at 380-
82. Industrial development was permitted only on the remainder of the tract. Id.
Ambler Realty sued to have the zoning ordinance declared an unconstitutional tak-
ing in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 384.
Specifically, Ambler Realty alleged "that the ordinance attempt[ed] to restrict and con-
trol the lawful uses of [Ambler's] land so as to confiscate and destroy a great part of its
value," deterring "prospective buyers of land for industrial, commercial and residential
uses.., from buying any part of [the] land." Id. at 384-85. The ordinance had substan-
tially reduced the value of that portion of the land zoned residential. If used for indus-
trial development, Ambler Realty's land was worth $10,000 per acre. Id. at 384. If lim-
ited to residential use, the land's value was limited to $2500 per acre. Id. Notwithstand-
ing the property devaluation, the Court refused to find that the zoning regulation effect-
ed a taking, and in the process upheld the constitutionality of zoning regulations in gen-
eral. Id. at 395.
" See Scott D. Godshall, Note, Land Use Regulation and the Free Exercise Clause,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 1562, 1568 (1984) (observing that with respect to zoning, "courts
have either ignored the free exercise issue, or have applied the free exercise clause in
such a way as to insulate land use regulations from [F]irst [A]mendment challenges");
Michael W. Macleod-Ball, Note, The Future of Zoning Limitations Upon Religious Uses
of Land: Due Process or Equal Protection?, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1087, 1095 (1988)
(noting that "[c]ourts typically view zoning restraints upon religious users' property as
acceptable legislative restriction upon religious action and refuse to hold such regula-
tions as an infringement upon individuals' beliefs"); see also Daniel R. Mandelker, The
First Amendment in Land Use Law, C851 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1007, 1068-77 (1993) (survey-
ing recent free exercise zoning disputes and noting that "[i]n both federal and state
courts the zoning officials usually prevail").
3 862 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1994).
40 885 F. Supp. 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
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sponsored programs that minister to the poor. Accordingly, if a zoning regu-
lation burdens such a program, strict scrutiny under RFRA is required.
A. Zoning Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause
Before RFRA's enactment, claims for religious exemptions from zoning
regulations were litigated under the Free Exercise Clause. Prior to Smith,
courts used the Sherbert test to analyze such claims.41 Because RFRA ex-
plicitly adopts Sherbert's free exercise analysis,42 earlier cases decided un-
der the Free Exercise Clause prove instructive to courts seeking to analyze a
RFRA claim. 3 History suggests that the nature of the religious and secular
interests involved clearly play a significant role in a court's determination of
whether to apply Sherbert's compelling interest test in order to grant a reli-
gious plaintiff an exemption to a generally applicable. zoning regulation."
In St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken,45 a New
Jersey court granted an injunction to prevent the city from closing a home-
less shelter and feeding program that was operated on church premises.46
Confronted by the "grave social problem" of homelessness, the court was
loath to close any shelter, observing:
41 See, e.g., Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820, 824 (10th
Cir. 1988); Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of
Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 309 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983); Burlington
Assembly of God Church v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 570 A.2d 495, 497-500 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989); St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of
Hoboken, 479 A.2d 935, 938 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983).
42 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 403 (1963).
41 See Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 171 (4th Cir. 1995) (not-
ing that because "RFRA does not purport to create a new substantial burden test,
[courts] may look to pre-RFRA cases in order to assess the burden" on religion); Thiry
v. Carlson, 887 F. Supp. 1407, 1412 (D. Kan. 1995) (observing that "[i]n applying
[RFRA's] strict scrutiny test courts are to look to Free Exercise Clause decisions of the
Supreme Court prior to its decision in Employment Division v. Smith"); S. REP. No.
111, supra note 7, at 8-9, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1898 (stating that "[t]he
committee expects that the courts will look to free exercise cases decided prior to Smith
for guidance in determining whether the exercise of religion has been substantially bur-
dened and the least restrictive means have been employed in furthering a compelling
governmental interest").
44 See COUSER, supra note 29, at 118 (arguing that "varying results ... reflect the
difference in value that different courts attribute to the governmental interest'in a strict
enforcement of the ordinance as opposed to the church's interest in the free exercise of
its religious rights").
4' 479 A.2d 935 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983).
46 Id. at 939.
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The harm here is obvious, imminent and severe. If the
shelter is closed its occupants will be left without food or
shelter .... St. John's represents the only bulwark these
homeless people have. To tear that bulwark away would be a
travesty of justice and compassion. Any inconvenience to the
City of Hoboken and its other residents pales into insignifi-
cance when contrasted with what the occupants of the shelter
would have to face if turned out into the city streets in win-
ter weather.47
In applying Sherbert, the court in St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church
cited "centuries of scripture and practice"4 to support its conclusion that
use of the church as a homeless shelter was "'customarily incident' to the
'principal uses"' of the church.49 Because there was a clear link between
the religious mandates and the conduct sought to be protected, the court
held that enforcement of the zoning regulation would pose a substantial
burden on the church's free exercise of religion.5" With little meaningful
analysis, the court failed to find any compelling government justification for
closing the shelter in the face of the plight of the homeless.5
Given the long history of church protection of the poor,52 it was not
unforeseeable that a receptive court would grant a zoning exemption to per-
mit churches to house and feed the homeless. Other courts, however, have
concluded that zoning regulations impose a substantial burden on conduct
that is not as clearly linked to religious beliefs as is ministry to the poor, so
long as the conduct has little impact on local land development and use.
Accordingly, in Burlington Assembly of God Church v. Zoning Board of
Adjustment,53 another New Jersey court held that the denial of a zoning
variance to permit erection of radio transmitter towers on church property
constituted a substantial burden on the church's "religious activity."54 As
part of a radio station, the purpose of which was to broadcast religious mes-
sages, the erection of the towers represented simply "one more activity [on
the church's] list of religious undertakings."55 The court granted a zoning
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 937.
o Id. at 938.
, See id. at 939.
52 See infra notes 115-130 and accompanying text.
13 570 A.2d 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989).
54 Id. at 500.
55 Id. at 499. The church also used the property to operate a 300-student school and
to store 35 buses. Id. at 496.
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variance for the towers after the municipality failed to prove its asserted
compelling interests in safety and avoiding transmission interference.56
In Burlington Assembly of God, the court adopted an expansive view of
religious conduct because it failed to see what harm the exemption would
cause to the "general welfare of the community."57 Failure to enforce the
zoning regulations to bar placement of two radio towers on the church's 106
acres of land would not have had an impact on the public welfare or the
ability of the locality to exert effective control over land development. Ac-
cordingly, the court's use of the compelling interest test was a reasonable
method of protecting the church's interests. Conversely, other courts have
applied a narrow view of religion in the context of Free Exercise Clause
protections, apparently in order to avoid the burden on the general welfare
that would have been occasioned had the compelling interest test been used
to exempt religious plaintiffs from zoning regulations.
In Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of
Lakewood," a church was denied a religious exemption because the zoning
ordinances were found not to burden religious activity. The Jehovah's Wit-
nesses sought to build a church on land that they had purchased in a resi-
dential neighborhood where churches were prohibited.59 The city denied the
church's application for a zoning exception, citing traffic, noise, and proper-
ty values.6' The court began its analysis by determining whether the ordi-
nance burdened the church's free exercise rights, noting that "[a]s a general
rule, the greater the cost of practicing one's religion, the more probable that
the statute creates an unconstitutional infringement."'" The court, however,
also considered "[t]he centrality of the burdened religious observance to the
believer's faith."62 Religious beliefs received absolute protection,63 but
conduct derived from religious beliefs was protected only if "integrally
related to the underlying beliefs."' After characterizing the building of the
church as an act that in and of itself had "no religious or ritualistic signifi-
16 Id. at 499-500. Characterizing the municipality's safety concern as "illusionary,"
the court noted "the absence of any real risk that the towers [might] fall or be struck by
lightning; they [were] too well designed for those risks to be given any weight." Id. at
499. Furthermore, FCC licensing of the station provided evidence that "the station could
be operated at 'acceptable' interference levels." Id.
"7 Id. at 498 (quoting State v. Cameron, 498 A.2d 1217, 1227 (N.J. 1985) (Clifford,
J., concurring in result)).
38 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (.1983).
'9 Id. at 304-05.
60 Id. at 305.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 306.
63 Id. (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)).
C Id.
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cance to the Jehovah's Witnesses," 65 the court concluded that "[a]t most
the Congregation [could only] claim that its freedom to worship [was] tan-
gentially related to worshipping in its own structure. '66 Construction of the
church was a "purely secular act" that resulted in only "an indirect financial
burden"; accordingly, Sherbert's compelling interest test was inapplicable.67
Under traditional due process analysis, the court found that the potential
burdens of traffic congestion and noise were sufficient to justify the
municipality's exercise of police power.68
In Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson,69 the Tenth Circuit
followed the reasoning of Lakewood to deny a similar zoning exemption to
a church that sought to build in an agricultural area.7" Once again the court
distinguished between direct and indirect burdens on religion, noting that the
zoning did not directly burden religious conduct, but merely imposed an
indirect financial burden on the church.7 Construction of a church on the
particular site selected, although preferred by the congregation, was not
"intimately related to the religious tenets of the church."72 Although the
county was imposing a burden on the secular act of construction, it placed
only an indirect burden on religious exercise.73 An indirect burden that was
rooted in secular conduct did not justify an exemption.74
Lakewood and Messiah Baptist Church, therefore, are instances in which
courts avoided the Free Exercise Clause's compelling interest test by finding
only an indirect burden on religion. The courts' decisions demonstrate that
the interpretation of the centrality of the conduct to the religious belief is of
paramount importance to successful litigation of a free exercise claim.75
Because RFRA analysis parallels that of the Free Exercise Clause,76 it is
likely that some courts may continue to avoid the compelling interest test
65 Id. at 306-07.
66 Id. at 307. "[B]uilding and owning a church [was] a desirable accessory of wor-
ship, not a fundamental tenet of the Congregation's religious beliefs." Id. But see Com-
ment, Zoning Ordinances Affecting Churches: A Proposal for Expanded Free Exercise
Protection, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1131, 1151-52 (1984) (arguing that "[a] religious
group's freedom to build a church in the neighborhood of its choice is ... an important
dimension of the right to self-expression inherent in religious freedom ... [and] should
be granted [F]irst [A]mendment protection").
67 Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 307.
68 Id. at 308.
69 859 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1988).
70 Id. at 825.
71 Id. at 825-26.
72 Id. at 825.
73 Id.
74 Id.
71 See id.; Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of
Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 308 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
76 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
19961 1271
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
mandated by RFRA. As documented by Western Presbyterian and Daytona
Rescue Mission, the incongruent results obtained under traditional free exer-
cise analysis have not been eliminated by the creation of a statutory right of
action. Plaintiffs still must persuade courts that their religious conduct is
burdened, and courts will once again be in the position of determining that
which constitutes protected religious conduct.
B. Zoning Exemptions Under RFRA
Recent federal district court opinions in the District of Columbia and
Florida provide ample evidence that church-sponsored homeless shelters and
soup kitchens may receive equally inconsistent protection from municipal
zoning under RFRA as they once received under the Free Exercise Clause.
As with prior decisions under the Free Exercise Clause, the initial determi-
nation of whether a municipal regulation substantially burdens the free exer-
cise of religion is of paramount importance to obtaining a religious exemp-
tion.
Western Presbyterian presents an instance in which a church successful-
ly asserted a claim under RFRA to permit operation of a homeless program
that was otherwise barred under local zoning regulations. In 1993, Western
Presbyterian Church in Washington, D.C. was planning to move to a new
location, where it sought to reopen Miriam's Kitchen, a homeless feeding
program that it had operated since 1984."7 Despite the prior success of the
feeding program, the Advisory Neighborhood Commission and a local citi-
zens group complained to the city zoning administrator about the church's
plans to feed the homeless at the new location.78 Those opposing the feed-
ing program feared that "the homeless ... would contribute to crime in the
neighborhood[,] ... result[ing] in a decline in property values."79 In re-
sponse to the neighborhood's complaints, the city zoning administrator de-
termined that the feeding program was barred by local zoning regulations."
Accordingly, the church would have had to obtain a variance to operate its
program.8'
"7 Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538,
540 (D.D.C. 1994). Through its program, Western Presbyterian served breakfast in the
church basement in addition to providing the homeless with bag lunches. Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 546. Notably, the Church had moved from a primarily commercial area near
the White House to a location near the Watergate Hotel, a significantly more upscale
part of the neighborhood of Foggy Bottom. Karen de Witt, New Attitude on Churches:
Not in My Backyard, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Mar. 27, 1994, at 14A.
8 Western Presbyterian, 862 F. Supp. at 546.
s' Id. at 540-41. "A variance is a form of administrative relief granted in response to
specific requests for changes in the zoning plan." Id. at 541 n.2. Under the law of the
District of Columbia:
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Initially, the church tried to have the feeding program declared an "ac-
cessory use," which would have obviated the need for a variance. 2 When
this attempt was unsuccessful, the church brought suit against the city in
federal district court, asserting that enforcement of the zoning regulations
would violate the church's and volunteers' rights under RFRA. 3
Western Presbyterian characterized its feeding program as "an integral
part of the Church's mission."' The church explained that its ministry to
the poor and hungry reflected the "Gospel and two thousand years of church
history." 5 In response, the District of Columbia asserted that it had not
placed a substantial burden on Western Presbyterian's exercise of reli-
gion. 6 Arguing that the burden was merely financial or inconvenient, the
District contended that prior Supreme Court precedents only found a burden
substantial if it prevented a person from freely exercising their religion
Variances are granted where "the strict application of any [zoning] regulation...
would result in peculiar and exceptional practical difficulties to or exceptional
and undue hardship on the owner of the property ... [p]rovided, that the relief
can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and without sub-
stantially impairing the intent, purpose, and integrity of the zone plan ....
Id. (emphasis added) (citing D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 11, § 3107.2).
The church had the option of moving its feeding program to another portion of its
lot that was under different zoning constraints, but it would still have needed a special
exemption. Id. at 540. "[A] 'special exemption' is a use specifically authorized ... but
only upon specific approval ... in individual cases[,] rather than as a matter of right."
CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 27, § 9.8, at 566-67. Western Presbyterian, therefore,
needed municipal approval wherever it located its feeding program.
82 Western Presbyterian, 862 F. Supp. at 541. District "zoning regulations provide
that '[a]ny other accessory use ... customarily incidental to the uses otherwise autho-
rized by this chapter shall be permitted in an SP district."' Id. (citing D.C. Mun. Regs.
tit. 11, § 502.7. Accordingly, Western Presbyterian was seeking to have the District rec-
ognize that use of the church for a homeless feeding program was a use customarily in-
cidental or subordinate to the principal use of the church-worship. See 2 ROBERT M.
ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 9.28, at 188 n.87 (3d ed. 1986). On appeal
from the zoning administrator's decision, the Board of Zoning Adjusters [BZA] deter-
mined that the program was not an accessory use, analogizing the feeding program to
"'Meals-on-Wheels[,]' which the BZA previously had found not to be an 'accessory
use' to a church." Western Presbyterian, 862 F. Supp. at 542.
83 Western Presbyterian, 862 F. Supp. at 542.
Statement of Points & Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Prelimi-
nary Injunction at 2, Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 849
F. Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1994) (No. 94-0749) [hereinafter Statement of Points & Au-
thorities].
8 Id. at 3 (quoting a Nov. 29, 1993 letter from Reverend James E. Andrews, Stated
Clerk of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (USA), to the District of
Columbia's Zoning Administrator).
86 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 12,
Western Presbyterian (No. 94-0749) [hereinafter Defendants' Opposition].
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"without fear of prosecution or loss of a government benefit."87 In addition,
the city questioned whether church doctrine even required Western Presbyte-
rian to feed the homeless from the church.88 Finally, the District questioned
the sincerity of Western Presbyterian's beliefs, noting that the feeding pro-
gram had only been established in the last ten years.89
Unpersuaded by the District's arguments, the court ruled that the
church's feeding program was "not merely a matter of personal choice
but ... a requirement for spiritual redemption ... motivated by sincere
religious belief."9 It noted that religious charity was "a central tenet of all
major religions"91 and that application of the District's zoning laws to
Western Presbyterian would place a substantial burden on the church's free
exercise of religion.9" Because the District of Columbia had conceded re-
peatedly that "it ha[d] no compelling governmental interest in prohibiting
Western Presbyterian from conducting its feeding program,"93 the court
granted a permanent injunction against the city on the basis of RFRA.94
Although the city initially challenged the decision, it ultimately dropped its
appeal when Western Presbyterian promised to avoid unreasonable noise or
traffic.95
Western Presbyterian counsels, therefore, that church-sponsored soup
kitchens and homeless shelters should obtain free exercise exemptions from
restrictive municipal zoning regulations.96 Nevertheless, Daytona Rescue
87 Id. at 13-14 (citing Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S.
378, 391 (1990); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).
8 Id. at 15. All of the examples cited by Western Presbyterian merely required the
church to minister to the poor; they did not require that the church use the actual build-
ing to provide that ministry. Id. The District noted that the church could have fed the
poor at another location, and that nothing prevented the church from operating its feed-
ing program at the new site, so long as it was run out of the residential portion of the
lot with a special exemption. Id.
89 Id. at 16.
Western Presbyterian, 862 F. Supp. at 544.
Id. (citing examples of required religious charity to the poor and hungry found in
Islam, Hinduism, and Judaism).
92 Id. at 547.
I d. at 545; see also Defendants' Opposition, supra note 86, at 12 n.5.
4 Western Presbyterian, 862 F. Supp. at 547. The Order "permanently enjoined [the
District of Columbia] from employing ... zoning regulations, or any other ... ordi-
nance, to prevent plaintiffs from administering their program to feed the homeless on
the Church premises or otherwise interfere in the operation of such feeding program so
long as the feeding program is conducted in an orderly manner and does not constitute
a nuisance." Id.
" Philip P. Pan, D.C. Pulls out of Fight over Soup Kitchen, WASH. POST, June 15,
1995, at D8.
96 For a recent case that has adopted Western Presbyterian's reasoning that enforce-
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Mission demonstrates that the inconsistencies of traditional free exercise
analysis still haunt the RFRA-revived compelling interest test.
In 1993, the Daytona Rescue Mission sought permission from local
authorities to open a "Church-Mission" on a property it owned in Daytona
Beach.97 The mission wished to use its property "as a facility for worship
services, daily housing of a limited number of homeless men, and daily
feeding of homeless men including those who would not be sheltered at the
facility."9" Although churches were permitted in each of the zones that en-
compassed the proposed site,99 the Local Development Code expressly pro-
vided that homeless shelters and food banks were not customarily related
activities and thus could not be considered accessory uses of the church."
Consequently, in order to operate a shelter on the property, the Missionwas
forced to apply for semi-public use status, which required local government
approval."0 When municipal approval was not granted, the Mission filed
suit alleging that its rights under the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA were
violated by enforcement of Daytona Beach's zoning regulations. 2
A federal district court rejected the Mission's claims under the Free
Exercise Clause on the basis of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in First As-
sembly of God of Naples, Florida, Inc. v. Collier County."°3 In applying
ment of zoning regulations against a church-sponsored homeless program may constitute
a substantial burden on religion, see Jesus Ctr. v. Farmington Hills Zoning Bd. of Ap-
peals, 544 N.W.2d 698, 704-05 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (observing that "providing shel-
ter or sanctuary to the needy ... has been part of the Christian religious tradition since
the days of the Roman Empire").
' Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 885 F. Supp. 1554, 1556
(M.D. Fla. 1995).
98 Id.
99 Id. Part of the property was zoned M-1, for local industry, while the balance was
zoned R-3, a residential designation. Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1555. The Mission also unsuccessfully alleged that enforcement of the regu-
lations violated the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses. Id.
103 Id. at 1557-58 (discussing First Assembly of God of Naples, Fla., Inc. v. Collier
County, 20 F.3d 419 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 730 (1995)). In First As-
sembly of God, a post-Smith decision made under the Free Exercise Clause, the court
refused to grant a zoning exemption to a church for its homeless shelter. First Assembly
of God, 20 F.3d at 424. Accepting "for the sake of argument that sheltering the home-
less [was] a central, essential element of the Christian religion," the Eleventh Circuit
nonetheless found the burden constitutional under the Supreme Court's Free Exercise
Clause analysis in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, and the
Eleventh Circuit's earlier analysis in Grosz v. City of Miami Beach. Id. at 423-24 (citing
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993);
Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
827 (1984)).
The burden on religious exercise in First Assembly of God was constitutional under
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First Assembly of God to the Mission's claims under the Free Exercise
Clause, the court in Daytona Rescue Mission concluded that "the burden on
religion [was] at the lower end of the spectrum.""' The court suggested
that the municipality's interest in safety and security outweighed the burden
on the Mission's exercise of religion because the city already had other
homeless shelters, and the church had only pursued an exemption at one
site. 5 Accordingly, the Free Exercise Clause provided no relief to the
Mission.
The Mission was equally unsuccessful under RFRA. The court initially
considered whether Daytona Beach's zoning regulations imposed a substan-
tial burden on the Mission's exercise of religion."° Although the result
was somewhat predictable, this inquiry was necessary because the court's
analysis of the burden under the Free Exercise Clause depended on the three
part balancing test enunciated in Grosz v. City of Miami Beach. 7 Under
RFRA, however, a court does not balance "competing governmental and
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye because it was the result of a neutral and generally
applicable zoning regulation that limited the location of homeless shelters. Id. at 423.
Accordingly, the burden did not need to "'be justified by a compelling governmental
interest even if the law ha[d] the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious
practice."' Id. (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2226).
Furthermore, the burden in First Assembly of God was equally constitutional under
Grosz. In Grosz, the Eleventh Circuit had enunciated a three-part test to determine the
constitutionality of a government burden on religion. Grosz, 721 F.2d at 733. "First, the
government regulation must regulate religious conduct, not belief. Second, the law must
have a secular purpose and a secular effect. Third, once these two thresholds are
crossed, the court engages in a balancing of competing governmental and religious in-
terests." Id. After determining that the zoning regulations met the first two prongs of
the Grosz test, the court in First Assembly of God balanced the competing influences to
conclude:
The burden on First Assembly to either conform its shelter to the zoning laws, or
to move the shelter to an appropriately zoned area, is less than the burden on the
County were it to be forced to allow the zoning violation. Thus, under the Grosz
test, First Assembly's right to free exercise of religion is not violated by the
County's zoning ordinances.
First Assembly of God, 20 F.3d at 424. The Eleventh Circuit, therefore, upheld enforce-
ment of local zoning regulations against a church-sponsored homeless shelter, permit-
ting a burden on "a central, essential element" of religious conduct under two different
interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 423. In denying First Assembly's
petition for rehearing, however, the court noted that neither party had raised the issue of
RFRA and therefore "decline[d] to discuss it." First Assembly of God of Naples, Fla.,
Inc. v. Collier County, 27 F.3d 526 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 730
(1995).
'04 Daytona Rescue Mission, 885 F. Supp. at 1558.
103 Id. at 1559.
106 Id.
107 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984).
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religious interests""8 to determine the substantiality of the burden on reli-
gious exercise. Instead, the court required
"the religious adherent . . . to prove that a governmental
[action] burdens the adherent's practice of his or her religion
by pressuring him or her to commit an act forbidden by the
religion or by preventing him or her from engaging in con-
duct or having a religious experience which the faith man-
dates. This interference must be more than an inconvenience;
the burden must be substantial . . .109
The Mission asserted that its exercise of religion was substantially bur-
dened because it was forced to seek government approval wherever it
sought to locate in the city. n0 Like the District of Columbia in Western
Presbyterian,"' Daytona Beach argued that its zoning regulations did not
present a serious obstacle to the Mission's shelter or soup kitchen."2 Rath-
er, the Mission simply was barred from opening its shelter at a particular
location; it could seek permission to open its facility at other locations with-
in the city." 3 Explicitly rejecting Western Presbyterian, the court found
with little discussion that Daytona Beach's regulations did not substantially
burden the Mission's free exercise rights under RFRA because the Mission
was not universally barred from locating elsewhere in the city."'
C. The Substantial Burden of Zoning Regulations
Although RFRA provides increased opportunity for zoning exemptions,
the incongruent results achieved in Western Presbyterian and-Daytona Res-
cue Mission illustrate that courts continue to have different perceptions of
that which constitutes religious exercise. Nevertheless, because the provision
of shelter and sustenance to the poor is "a central tenet of all major reli-
gions,""' 5 courts should recognize that enforcement of zoning regulations
108 See id. at 733.
109 Daytona Rescue Mission, 885 F. Supp. at 1559-60 (quoting Vernon v. City of
L.A., 27 F.3d 1385, 1393 (9th Cir.) (citations omitted) (alteration in original), cert. de-
nied, 115 S. Ct. 510 (1994)).
"
0
. Id. at 1560.
... See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
112 Daytona Rescue Mission, 885 F. Supp. at 1560.
113 Id.
114 Id. (rejecting Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F.
Supp. 538, 545-46 (D.D.C. 1994)).
115 Western Presbyterian, 862 F. Supp. at 544.
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against church-sponsored shelters may result in a substantial burden on reli-
gious exercise.
Western Presbyterian provides a typical example of a church's religious
mandate to serve the poor. As part of Western Presbyterian's mission, the
congregation is instructed to serve God by "ministering to the needs of the
poor, the sick, the lonely, and the powerless, engaging in the struggle to free
people from sin, fear, oppression, hunger, and injustice, [and] giving itself
and its substance to the service of those who suffer." '116 Although the
church found much support for its position in biblical teachings," 7 many
major religions require acts of charity as part of worship."8
116 Statement of Points & Authorities, supra note 84, at 3 (quoting CONSTITUTION OF
THE PRESBYTARIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.), PART II, BOOK OF ORDER at G-3.0300(c)(3)(b)-
(c) (1994)). In addition, the mission of Western Presbyterian Church is
[p]rimarily but not limited to, promoting a spirit of Christian influence within the
fellowship of the congregation and upon the community; to provide religious.
education by communicating the unchanging Gospel through teaching, preaching
and ministering to all who are in need; to gather to worship God and share sacra-
ments and teachings of our religious faith; to provide a Christian fellowship
among our members and to the community at large; and to assist in charitable
work of any nature deemed beneficial.
Western Presbyterian, 862 F. Supp. at 544 (citing BYLAWS OF WESTERN PRESBYTERIAN
CHURCH, art. 1).
117 The Bible instructs:
For I was an hungred [sic], and ye gave me meat; I was thirsty, and ye gave me
drink; I was a stranger, and ye took me in ... Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as
ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto
me.
Then shall he say also unto them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye
cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels: For I was an
hungred, and ye gave me no meat; I was thirsty and ye gave me no drink; I was
stranger, and ye took me not in ... And these shall go away into everlasting
punishment; but the righteous into life eternal.
Western Presbyterian, 862 F. Supp. at 544 n.3 (quoting Matthew 25:35, 40-43, 46).
Additional support for Western Presbyterian's position was found in Ezekiel 18:5-9
("If a person is righteous and does what is lawful and right . . .and gives his bread to
the hungry and covers the naked with a garment ... he is righteous, he shall surely
live, says the Lord God.") and James 2:14-17 ("What does it profit, my brethren, if a
man says he has faith, but has not works? Can his faith save him? If a brother or sister
is ill-clad and in lack of daily food, and one of you says to them, 'Go in peace, be
warmed and filled,' without giving them the things needed for the body, what does it
profit? So faith by itself, if it has no works, is dead."). Id.
118 Id. at 544. In particular, the court in Western Presbyterian noted:
[O]ne of the five Pillars of Islam-the fundamental ritual requirements of wor-
ship, including ritual prayer-requires Muslims of sufficient means to give alms
to the poor and other classes of recipients. Also Hindus belonging to the Brahmin,
Ksatriya, and Vaisya castes are required to fulfill five daily obligations of wor-
ship, one of which is making offerings to guests, symbolized by giving food to a
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Unlike the District of Columbia in Western Presbyterian,119 municipal-
ities rarely question the sincerity of the religious beliefs that motivate
churches to sponsor homeless shelters and soup kitchens. Instead, municipal-
ities argue that enforcement of zoning regulations against a church-spon-
sored program does not substantially burden religious exercise because a
church is not forced by its beliefs to use a particular site for a homeless
program."0 In effect, municipalities adopt the rationale of Lakewood and
Messiah Baptist Church to contend that the location of the church-sponsored
homeless program is not central to a church's religion. 2 This rationale
should be rejected because (1) the religious tradition of sanctuary counsels
that the church is the appropriate place to shelter and minister to the poor,
and (2) a municipality that permits a church to operate at a given location
should not then be permitted to regulate the methods of worship. According-
ly, preventing a congregation from using its property for a homeless pro-
gram constitutes a substantial burden on religious exercise.
Use of a church for homeless programs is related to the historical role of
churches in providing a sanctuary to the poor and oppressed. 22 As the
court noted in St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church, the religious tradi-
tion of sanctuary is so strong as to have been "recognized in Roman, medi-
eval, and English common law. During the middle ages every church was a
potential sanctuary."'2 3 Noting the role of churches as sanctuaries for fugi-
tive slaves, the court observed that "'churches and religious persons became
priest or giving food or aid to the poor. The concept finds its place in Judaism in
the form of tendering to the poor clothing for the naked, food for the hungry, and
benevolence to the needy.
Id. (citing DICTIONARY OF LIVING RELIGIONS 316, 347, 387-88 (Keith Crim ed., 1981)).
For further discussion of the religious mandate to minister to the poor, see Susan L.
Goldberg, Gimme Shelter: Religious Provision of Shelter to the Homeless as a Protect-
ed Use Under Zoning Laws, 30 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 75, 84-87 (1986).
119 See Defendants' Opposition, supra note 86, at 16 (questioning the sincerity of
Western Presbyterian's beliefs because the homeless program had only been opened
within the last 10 years).
120 See Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 885 F. Supp. 1554,
1559 (M.D. Fla. 1995); Defendants' Opposition, supra note 86, at 15.
121 See supra notes 65-67, 71-73 and accompanying text.
122 See St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken, 479 A.2d 935,
937 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983) (noting that "'[t]hroughout history the churches
have carried out [the] biblical mandate to aid the poor and the helpless"') (quoting Affi-
davit of Rev. Felske at 2); see also supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
" St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church, 479 A.2d at 937; see also Jesus Ctr. v.
Farmington Hills Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 544 N.W.2d 698, 704 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)
(noting that "providing shelter or sanctuary to the needy ... has been part of the Chris-
tian religious tradition since the days of the Roman Empire"); Greentree at Murray Hill
Condominium v. Good Shepherd Episcopal Church, 550 N.Y.S.2d 981, 984 (Sup. Ct.
1989).
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stations along the Underground Railroad providing food and shelter.""'
From the traditional use of churches as sanctuaries for the oppressed comes
the contemporary practice of using churches to house and feed the
poor-the "church as a sanctuary for the poor [has become] a religious use
'customarily incident' to the 'principle uses"' of a church."z
Moreover, "[o]nce the zoning authorities of a city permit the construc-
tion of a church in a particular locality, the city must refrain, absent extraor-
dinary circumstances, from in any way regulating what religious functions
the church may conduct." '126 When a municipality argues that the location
of a church-sponsored homeless program is not central to the church's reli-
gious beliefs, it is making a judgment as to whether use of the church itself
is part of the religious worship. As the United States Supreme Court ob-
served in United States v. Ballard:27 "Man's relation to his God was made
no concern of the state. He was granted the right to worship as he pleased
and to answer to no man for the verity of his religious views.' 128 "[T]he
concept of acts of charity [is] an essential part of religious worship";'29
courts and legislatures are not in a position to determine whether this "es-
sential part of religious worship" directs the use of the church. 3'
Accordingly, despite the apparently incongruent results demonstrated by
Western Presbyterian Church and Daytona Rescue Mission, enforcement of
zoning regulations against homeless programs clearly poses a substantial
burden on the exercise of religion. RFRA's revived recognition of the im-
portance of free exercise counsels that its compelling interest test should be
applied to municipal land regulation of church-sponsored homeless shelters
and soup kitchens.
III. PERMISSIBLE RESTRICTIONS OF CHURCH-SPONSORED HOMELESS
PROGRAMS
Under traditional due process analysis, zoning restrictions are constitu-
tional unless "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial rela-
tion to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."'' Neverthe-
12 St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church, 479 A.2d at 937 (quoting Affidavit of
Rev. Felske at 13).
125 Id.
126 Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538,
546 (D.D.C. 1994).
127 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
1'2 Id. at 87.
129 Western Presbyterian, 862 F. Supp. at 544.
,3o See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87 (noting that "it would hardly be supposed that [a reli-
gious believer] could be tried before a jury charged with the duty of determining
whether those teachings contained false representations").
131 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
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less, in instances where zoning significantly burdens the free exercise of
religion, a municipality must satisfy RFRA's stricter standards. Western
Presbyterian and St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church counsel that
church-sponsored soup kitchens and homeless shelters come within the
scope of religious conduct that was intended to be protected under
RFRA.'32 Accordingly, a municipality must have a compelling reason to
enforce its zoning regulations against the church-sponsored program, and
enforcement of the regulations must be the least restrictive means of further-
ing the compelling interest.
133
Municipalities typically assert that enforcement of zoning regulations
against programs that minister to the homeless is necessary to prevent the
devaluation of property or an increase in noise and crime, or to protect the
character of the neighborhood and the general zoning scheme. 3 1 Although
these may be compelling interests, application of zoning regulations to bar
operation of the church-sponsored homeless shelter or soup kitchen usually
should be considered too excessive to satisfy RFRA's least restrictive means
requirement. Nevertheless, even if a church-sponsored homeless program is
permitted to operate in deviation from generally applicable zoning regula-
tions, municipalities may continue to exert some limited control over its
operation through building and safety regulations and, should it become
necessary, common law nuisance actions.
A. Compelling Justifications for Municipal Zoning of Church-Sponsored
Homeless Programs
Because of the high value placed on religious exercise, traditional mea-
sures of the reasonableness of enforcing zoning regulations are of little use:
the emphasis on the "high character of religious use ... seems clearly to
subordinate the interest of neighboring landowners."' 35 The maintenance of
property values or interests founded on speculative fears are insufficiently
compelling government interests.'36 Similarly, although cases have held the
132 See supra notes 49-51, 85-94 and accompanying text.
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
134 See, e.g., First Assembly of God of Naples, Fla., Inc. v. Collier County, 20 F.3d
419 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding a compelling interest in maintenance of zoning scheme),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 730 (1995); Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona
Beach, 885 F. Supp. 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (finding a compelling interest in protection
of general zoning scheme); Jesus Ctr. v. Farmington Hills Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 544
N.W.2d 698 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (finding a compelling interest in prevention of
crime).
135 2 ANDERSON, supra note 82, § 12.23, at 548; see also Alpine Christian Fel-
lowship v. County Comm'rs, 870 F. Supp. 991, 994 (D. Colo. 1994) (noting that be-
cause the state "must show some 'compelling state interest,' the state interests
which justify zoning codes in general are not applicable").
136 See 2 ANDERSON, supra note 82, § 12.24, at 550 (noting that "[a]n adverse effect
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maintenance of the character of a neighborhood and a general zoning
scheme to be compelling interests, 3 1 such interests should be less compel-
ling when a church is seeking to operate a homeless shelter or soup kitchen
in its present building.138 On the other hand, the prevention of crime,
noise, and litter are compelling municipal interests.' Accordingly, if a
city asserts such compelling justifications, it may enforce its zoning regula-
tions so long as enforcement constitutes the least restrictive means of
achieving the municipal interests.
In Western Presbyterian, the issue of a compelling state interest was
moot; the District of Columbia had conceded repeatedly that "it ha[d] no
compelling governmental interest in prohibiting Western Presbyterian from
conducting its feeding program ... so long as appropriate controls [were] in
place."'"4 Had the District been less quick to concede that its interest was
less than compelling, it might have mounted a more successful defense to
the church's challenge.
If the District had demonstrated that the church's feeding program
would have had a substantial negative effect on the safety of the neighbor-
hood, it could have asserted a compelling interest in the denial of a zoning
exemption. The District could have attempted to demonstrate the increased
on property values is an insufficient reason for denial of a permit to establish a reli-
gious use"); see also Alpine Christian Fellowship, 870 F. Supp. at 994 (noting that
"negative reaction of the residents in the neighborhood ... of course, does not consti-
tute a compelling governmental interest"); Greentree at Murray Hill Condominium v.
Good Shepherd Episcopal Church, 550 N.Y.S.2d 981, 989 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (refusing to
enjoin church homeless shelter for reasons "based solely on speculative fears of crime,
drugs and diminution of property values"). See generally Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993) (holding that city ordinance pro-
hibiting the ritual slaughter of animals did not serve a compelling governmental inter-
est).
1' See, e.g., Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City of S.F., 896 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th
Cir. 1990) (noting a "strong [municipal] interest in the maintenance of the integrity of
its zoning scheme and the protection of its residential neighborhoods"); Grosz v. City of
Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 738 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding significant interests in
prevention of traffic, noise, and litter), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984); Daytona Res-
cue Mission, 885 F. Supp. at 1560 (noting in dicta that the municipality has a compel-
ling interest in "enforcing fair and reasonable regulations throughout its jurisdiction").
138 At that point, the program's impact on the zoning scheme or character of the
neighborhood will be minimal if the program will not substantially alter the character of
the church. If, however, the church seeks to construct a large apartment-style shelter in
a neighborhood of single family homes, the municipality's interests would be more
compelling.
131 See, e.g., Grosz, 721 F.2d at 738 (finding significant interests in the prevention of
traffic, noise, and litter); City of Rapid City v. Kahler, 334 N.W.2d 510, 513 (S.D.
1983) (noting that "[t]he public is entitled to preservation of its health and safety").
'"0 Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538,
545 (D.D.C. 1994).
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risk to public safety by comparing crime statistics at similar feeding pro-
grams in the District, both before a program was instituted, and after a pro-
gram had begun. Furthermore, in between the time that Judge Sporkin grant-
ed the preliminary injunction and the time he granted the permanent injunc-
tion, the director of Western Presbyterian's feeding program was attacked by
a homeless man who was eating breakfast at the church.' The director
was out of work for almost four months with a fractured skull, and although
she said that "most" of the program users were well-behaved, local leaders
considered the attack to be evidence of the feeding program's increased
threat to neighborhood safety."' Accordingly, even after the preliminary
injunction was granted, the District might still have established a compelling
government interest by demonstrating that the feeding program posed a
threat to public safety.
Difficulties arise, however, when a municipality attempts to prove that
enforcement of its zoning regulations is the least restrictive means possible
of achieving the municipality's compelling interest.'43 Assuming that the
District had asserted a compelling interest in public safety, it would have
had to show that preventing the feeding program from operating out of
Western Presbyterian was the least restrictive means possible of achieving
that goal. Whether a complete shut down of the program would have been
the least restrictive means is debatable. The church probably could have
argued successfully that there were other methods that would have worked
equally well-increased internal security, restricted hours, and a larger po-
lice presence in the neighborhood are but a few. Before shutting down the
program, the District would have had to "at least initially attempt to address
community concerns" through other, less draconian, means.'" According-
ly, although there are instances in which a municipality can assert a compel-
ling interest to justify its zoning, it often may be difficult to demonstrate
that its burden on religion is the least restrictive means of achieving that
goal. Thus, church-sponsored homeless shelters and soup kitchens often
should obtain free exercise exemptions from restrictive municipal zoning
regulations.
B. Post-Exemption Municipal Control
Even though a municipality often will be unable to meet the burdens of
RFRA's compelling interest test so as to justify its enforcement of zoning
'"" Hamil R. Harris & Toni Locy, Soup Kitchen Director Back on Job After Attack:
Some Still Call Foggy Bottom Program Unsafe, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1994, at B8.
142 Id.
143 See Comment, supra note 66, at 1155 n.114.
144 See Jesus Ctr. v. Farmington Hills Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 544 N.W.2d 698, 705
(Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
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regulations against a church-sponsored homeless shelter or soup kitchen, it
nevertheless retains two important methods of minimizing any negative
effects of such programs: building and safety regulations, and common law
nuisance actions.
1. Building and Safety Regulations
Like their secular counterparts, church-sponsored homeless programs are
subject to the -constraints of appropriate applicable health and safety require-
ments. 145 Accordingly, courts have enforced local ordinances requiring the
installation of fire safety devices.' Similarly, a church may not operate a
homeless shelter or soup kitchen in violation of reasonable occupancy limits
designed to ensure safe operation.'47 Finally, church-sponsored shelters and
soup kitchens should comply with reasonable health regulations governing
food preparation and cleanliness.'48 A municipality's interest in the en-
forcement of its health and safety regulations is of sufficient "magnitude to
justify even substantial inroads on the free exercise of religion."'49
Nevertheless, in applying and enforcing health and safety regulations to
church-sponsored programs that minister to the poor, municipalities and
courts must maintain a realistic perspective on what constitutes reasonable
regulation.
The requirements should be appropriate to a shelter for the
homeless.... Moreover, the laws and regulations should be
interpreted in a reasonable and common sense manner bear-
ing in mind that overly strict enforcement might force the
shelter to close, leaving its occupants in a far worse state
than remaining in a crowded shelter."'
145 See 2 ANDERSON, supra note 82, § 12.23, at 546; COUSER, supra note 29, at 122.
146 See, e.g., Congregation Beth Yitzchok of Rockland, Inc. v. Town of Ramapo, 593
F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (requiring a synagogue to install fire-safety devices if it
wished to operate a religious nursery school); Market Street Mission v. Bureau of
Rooming & Boarding House Standards, 541 A.2d 668 (N.J. 1988) (permitting enforce-
ment of fire regulations against a religious mission that operated a rooming house), ap-
peal dismissed, 488 U.S. 882 (1988); cf Antrim Faith Baptist Church v. Common-
wealth, 460 A.2d 1228, 1231 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) (holding that fire regulations do
not burden a church school's religious exercise and noting the compelling state interest
in protecting human life).
147 See St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken, 479 A.2d 935,
939 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983) (requiring that church shelter not be dangerously
overcrowded).
148 Id. (requiring church shelter to comply with "appropriate health and safety laws").
149 Congregation Beth Yitzchok, 593 F. Supp. at 663.
ISo St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church, 479 A.2d at 939; see also Goldberg, su-
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A church-sponsored shelter or soup kitchen, although offering living accom-
modations or meals, is not a hotel or restaurant. Although basic standards of
cleanliness and safety are mandated, it is unwarranted and often financially
impossible to demand that charitable homeless programs meet the same
requirements as those to which commercial establishments are subject. Mu-
nicipal enforcement of health and safety regulations beyond that which is
necessary and appropriate for a church-sponsored homeless program would
therefore be insufficiently tailored to satisfy RFRA.
2. Common Law Nuisance Actions
Churches that secure exemptions should "be at least as sensitive to their
neighbors'. legitimate concern to be free of disturbance as they would wish
their neighbors to be to them.' ' . Nevertheless, on some occasions, contin-
ued operation of a church-sponsored homeless shelter or soup kitchen may
engender a host of problems for the program's neighbors. In those instances,
municipalities and neighborhood associations may resort to public nuisance
actions in an effort to obtain relief from those church-sponsored programs
that "interfer[e] with the health and safety of the public.'1 2 Even if result-
ing from a church-sponsored program, a nuisance is "not insulated by the
First Amendment from some curtailment, restriction, or regulation."'53
A church shelter or soup kitchen may be liable as a public nuisance if it
is operated in such a way "as to offend public morals, interfere with use by
the public of a public place or endanger or injure the property, health, safety
or comfort of a considerable number of persons."'54 Compliance with local
pra note 118, at 109 (noting that health and safety regulations "should not be so strin-
gent that the church would be defeated in its mission to assist the homeless").
151 COUSER, supra note 29, at 121.
152 Wilkinson v. LaFranz, 574 So. 2d 403, 407 (La. Ct. App. 1991); see also Western
Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538, 547 (D.D.C.
1994) (permitting operation of church-sponsored shelter "so long as the feeding pro-
gram is conducted in an orderly manner and does not constitute a nuisance"); Armory
Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Community Servs., 712 P.2d 914 (Ariz. 1985)
(affirming preliminary injunction of public nuisance caused by church-sponsored feed-
ing program for indigents).
" Wilkinson, 574 So. 2d at 407 (noting also that "[f]reedom of religion does not
provide anyone with the right to conduct a true nuisance"); see also Osborne v. Power,
890 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Ark. 1994) (observing that RFRA "would not [operate to] bar re-
strictions on activities that are nuisances"); Tennessee ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527
S.W.2d 99, 111 (Tenn. 1975) ("Free exercise of religion .. .does not include the right
to commit or maintain a nuisance."). See generally John Lasseigne, Comment, Struc-
tured Charity: The Clash Between Zoning Laws and Religious Free Exercise in New
Orleans Soup Kitchens, 37 LoY. L. REV. 279, 297-303 (1991) (analyzing nuisance
claim against Louisiana soup kitchens under Louisiana law).
154 Greentree at Murray Hill Condominium v. Good Shepherd Episcopal Church, 550
1996] 1285
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
zoning regulations does not bar a finding of a public nuisance.' 5  Similar-
ly, a church-sponsored program will not escape responsibility by arguing
that the church has no control over acts committed by its patrons off church
premises. 156 Valid reasons for which a municipality or a neighborhood as-
sociation might seek to enjoin a church-sponsored shelter or soup kitchen as
a nuisance include excessive noise or litter; public drunkenness, loitering, or
urination; assaults; and excessive panhandling.'57
In Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Community Servic-
es,'58 the Supreme Court of Arizona balanced "the utility and reasonable-
ness of the conduct ... against the extent of harm inflicted and the nature
of the affected neighborhood"'59 to determine whether an injunction
against a church-sponsored feeding program was appropriate. Surrounding
property owners complained that
[t]ransients frequently trespassed onto residents' yards, some-
times urinating, defecating, drinking and littering on the
residents' property. A few broke into storage areas and unoc-
cupied homes, and some asked residents for handouts. The
number of arrests [had] increased dramatically. Many resi-
dents were frightened or annoyed by the transients and [had]
altered their lifestyles to avoid them."
Although recognizing that the program's "charitable purpose ... [was] enti-
tled to greater deference than pursuits of lesser intrinsic value," the court
concluded that the extent of the interference was substantial enough to con-
N.Y.S.2d 981, 988 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (refusing to enjoin church shelter as a public nui-
sance after neighboring landowner failed to allege facts to support a public nuisance
claim and because the municipality was the proper party to bring a public nuisance
suit). But see Armory Park, 712 P.2d at 918-19 (permitting neighborhood residents and
homeowners association to bring public nuisance action against church-sponsored feed-
ing program); Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972)
(permitting private party developer to prosecute and prevail in a public nuisance action
against neighboring feed lot owner).
'5 Armory Park, 712 P.2d at 921.
156 Id. at 920 (holding that church-sponsored feeding program could be "enjoined up-
on the showing of a causal connection" between the feeding program and the nuisance).
The issue is whether the shelter or soup kitchen "frequently attract[s] patrons whose
conduct violate[s] the rights of residents to peacefully use and enjoy their property." Id.
157 Id. at 916, 920-21; see also Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Ad-
justment, 862 F. Supp. 538, 546 (D.D.C. 1994) (noting that citizens "are entitled to
walk the streets without being harassed by panhandlers or assaulted in any way").
158 712 P.2d 914 (Ariz. 1985).
159 Id. at 921.
160 Id. at 916.
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stitute a nuisance.16 ' The court refused to "believe that the law allows the
costs of a charitable enterprise to be visited ... upon the residents of a
single neighborhood."'
62
In crafting a remedy for a public nuisance occasioned by operation of a
church-sponsored program for the homeless, a court nevertheless is con-
strained by RFRA's "least restrictive means" requirement. 63 If a program
is "willing to work with city officials to develop guidelines ... to mitigate
community concerns[,] ... the City must at least initially attempt to address
community concerns in this fashion."lM Only after lesser means have
failed is a permanent injunction warranted.
Municipalities and neighborhoods are not forced to suffer unreasonable
burdens posed by church-sponsored homeless shelters and soup kitchens. If
operation of the program results in substantial interference with the sur-
rounding community, church-sponsored programs may be enjoined as nui-
sances without offending RFRA.
CONCLUSION
In RFRA, Congress has rejected the Supreme Court's narrow interpreta-
tion of Smith to once again place free exercise rights in their constitutionally
privileged position. Nevertheless, church-sponsored homeless shelters and
soup kitchens still will be forced to demonstrate a close link between the
operation of the shelters and their religious beliefs. Ministry to the poor,
however, is a fundamental form of worship entitled to RFRA's protections.
Because municipal zoning regulations may burden church-sponsored home-
less programs, enforcement of such regulations should only be permitted if
justified by a compelling interest. In those instances where a municipality
has a compelling interest, enforcement must be the least restrictive means of
achieving that interest; otherwise, a RFRA-based free exercise exemption is
due. Even if an exemption is granted, operation of shelters and soup kitch-
ens must still comply with reasonable municipal restrictions, and courts will
not excuse a nuisance simply because it results from the free exercise of
religion. Accordingly, with appropriate judicial interpretation of RFRA,
church-sponsored homeless shelters and soup kitchens should be able to
fulfill their religious mandates of ministering to the poor without fear that
local zoning will prevent the programs from operating.
MARc-OLIvIER LANGLOIS
161 Id. at 921.
162 Id.
163 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (Supp. V 1993); see also Jesus Ctr. v. Farmington Hills
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 544 N.W.2d 698, 703-05 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
'64 Jesus Ctr., 544 N.W.2d at 705.
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